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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-3483 
______________ 
 
ADEDAMOLA ABOLAJI GANIU, 
    Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A073-167-224) 
Immigration Judge: Alberto J. Riefkohl 
 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 10, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and COWEN,  
Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed:  July 12, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Adedamola Abolaji Ganiu petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’s order denying his motion for reconsideration of an earlier motion to reopen 
removal proceedings. We will deny the petition. 
I 
Ganiu, a native and citizen of Nigeria, arrived in the United States around 1993. 
Not long after that, Ganiu applied for asylum with the legacy Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. After he was interviewed by an asylum officer, Ganiu was 
charged with removability by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Ganiu then 
appeared at two hearings where the immigration judge granted continuances to secure 
counsel. Ganiu eventually failed to appear at the final hearing date in 1996 and the 
immigration judge entered an order of deportation in absentia.  
Despite a deportation order, Ganiu remained in the United States. Several years 
later, Ganiu married a United States citizen and applied to register as a permanent 
resident. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied that application 
because of Ganiu’s pending deportation order, and instead referred him back to the 
immigration court.  
Unable to become a permanent resident because of the deportation order, Ganiu 
then sought to reopen his removal proceedings from 1996. An immigration judge denied 
his first motion to reopen as untimely and for failing to establish eligibility for relief, and 
the Board affirmed. Ganiu again moved to reopen, this time asserting a fear of 
persecution from Boko Haram as a perceived foreigner because of the decades he lived in 
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the United States. The Board again denied Ganiu’s motion. After this second denial, 
Ganiu moved for reconsideration, introducing additional evidence of Boko Haram’s 
violence. The Board held that Ganiu failed to identify an error of fact or law in the prior 
order; even construing his motion as a third motion to reopen due to the new evidence of 
Boko Haram’s violence, it still failed to support a prima facie persecution claim. So the 
Board denied Ganiu’s motion. Ganiu petitions this Court for review.  
II1 
We review the Board’s denial of both a motion to reopen and a motion to 
reconsider for abuse of discretion. Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Our review of the Board’s decision is deferential, and “[w]e will disturb the [Board’s] 
denial of a motion to reopen or to reconsider only if it was ‘arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.’” Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Guo v. 
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
The Board did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ganiu’s motion for 
reconsideration. To prevail, an alien must specify errors of fact or law in the Board’s 
decision, supported by relevant authority. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(b)(1). The Board held that Ganiu failed to point to any evidence or relevant 
legal authorities overlooked in its earlier decision, and he points to none on appeal.  
                                              
1 The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) and (c). We have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). But we lack jurisdiction to review unexhausted claims under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 
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Though it declined to reconsider its earlier decision, the Board gave Ganiu the 
benefit of construing his motion for reconsideration as a motion to reopen the 
proceedings. Generally, an alien may file only one motion to reopen within 90 days from 
the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(2). But this deadline does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of 
“changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which 
removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would 
not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The “previous proceeding” refers to 
the proceeding before the immigration judge. Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2006). Even if an alien overcomes this procedural hurdle, the Board may grant 
motions to reopen only under compelling circumstances. Guo, 386 F.3d at 561. A motion 
to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for relief, but even then, the Board still 
has discretion to deny it. Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Guo, 396 F.3d at 563); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). 
Ganiu has failed to make out a prima facie persecution claim because the record 
lacks evidence that he belongs to a “particular social group.” Ganiu argues that the Board 
erred in holding that a group composed of Nigerians who have lived for many years in 
the United States do not exhibit the requisite social distinction to constitute a particular 
social group. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (providing that the Attorney General may 
grant asylum if an alien establishes refugee status); id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (stating that one 
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way to establish refugee status is through a “well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of … membership in a particular social group”).2  
We review de novo whether a particular social group exists, and we review 
underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 
543 (3d Cir. 2018). The Board requires that a particular social group be socially 
“distinct,” meaning “whether the people of a given society would perceive a proposed 
group as sufficiently separate or distinct[.]” Id. at 550 (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. 
& N. Dec. 227, 241 (BIA 2014)). Social distinction requires members of the group to 
“share an immutable, though not literally visible, characteristic.” Id. at 551. 
In his petition for review, Ganiu makes a conclusory statement about his status as 
a non-local, but he points to no evidence that Nigerians view as socially distinct 
countrymen who have lived abroad for a period of time. See S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 556 
(requiring proof of societal views for social distinction). Nor does Ganiu show 
persecution based on that distinction, as the record contains no evidence that Boko Haram 
targets non-locals any more than locals. Without exception, the record here reflects the 
indiscriminate and broad nature of Boko Haram’s violence, not just towards certain 
groups. See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “ordinary 
criminal activity does not rise to the level of persecution necessary to establish eligibility 
                                              
2 For withholding-of-removal eligibility, aliens must show that it is more likely than not 
that they would suffer persecution upon returning home. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y 
Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011). “Since [that] standard is more demanding than 
that governing eligibility for asylum, an alien who fails to qualify for asylum is 
necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal.” Id.  
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for asylum”); Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Mere generalized 
lawlessness and violence between diverse populations, of the sort which abounds in 
numerous countries and inflicts misery upon millions of innocent people daily around the 
world, generally is not sufficient to permit the Attorney General to grant asylum[.]”). 
Ganiu’s most recent motion, construed as a motion to reopen, lacks evidence of a 
prima facie case: social distinction and persecution based on that distinction. Without this 
evidence, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying what it construed as Ganiu’s 
motion to reopen his proceedings.3  
*   *   * 
We will deny Ganiu’s petition for review of the Board’s order denying his motion 
for reconsideration. 
                                              
3 Ganiu also argues that he has a valid claim under the Convention Against Torture that 
the Board never considered. But Ganiu never raised this claim to the Board. Because 
Ganiu failed to exhaust this claim before the agency, we lack jurisdiction to review it. 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  
